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Abstract
In this paper we propose a recursive equilibrium algorithm for the numerical simulation
of nonoptimal dynamic economies. This algorithm builds upon a convergent operator over
an expanded set of state variables. The fixed point of this operator defines the set of all
Markovian equilibria. We study approximation properties of the operator. We also apply
our recursive equilibrium algorithm to various models with heterogeneous agents, incomplete
financial markets, endogenous and exogenous borrowing constraints, taxes, and money.
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1.

Introduction
In this paper we propose a reliable recursive equilibrium algorithm for the numerical simulation

of nonoptimal dynamic economies, and study its convergence and accuracy properties. Numerical
simulation of these economies is usually a formidable task because of various technical issues that
preclude direct application of standard dynamic programming techniques. We apply our numerical
algorithm to various models with heterogeneous agents and real and financial frictions. The quantitative analysis of these models becomes critical to advance our understanding in several basic areas
of macroeconomics and finance.
Standard solution methods search for a continuous equilibrium function over a natural state
space of exogenous and endogenous state variables. Since the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott
(1980), it is well known that equilibria of nonoptimal economies may not admit a recursive representation over this natural state space. These authors consider a game of optimal taxation, and rewrite
their model in a recursive form by appending a Lagrange multiplier to the original state space so
as to characterize the exact solution. Their simple model comprises a representative household,
and the set of continuation Lagrange multipliers is unique. This uniqueness property is a rather
limiting condition for many other economies.
Our recursive equilibrium algorithm applies to a broad range of dynamic competitive-markets
economies. We consider an abstract framework, and provide a characterization of Markovian equilibrium representations towards the numerical simulation of these economies. While some characterizations of Markovian equilibria for nonoptimal economies are available, these characterizations
are model-dependent. Moreover, the numerical implementation of the proposed algorithms together
with their approximation properties have never been analyzed in the literature.
Numerical simulation of nonoptimal economies by standard solution methods may result in
substantial approximation errors. We simulate below a simple overlapping generations (OLG) model
by an established algorithm under a continuous equilibrium function. The computed solution may
present large approximation errors, and fail to mimic the true dynamics. In spite of these large
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approximation errors, the algorithm can be quite deceptive as it produces small Euler equation
residuals, or may do well under some other independent accuracy checks. Peralta-Alva and Santos
(2010) discuss some of the pitfalls in the computation of equilibrium solutions for an economy with
distortionary taxation.
Positive results on existence of a continuous equilibrium over a natural state space rely upon
certain monotonicity properties of the equilibrium dynamics (e.g., see Bizer and Judd 1989, Coleman
1991, and Datta, Mirman and Reffett 2002). For the canonical one-sector growth model with taxes
and externalities, monotone dynamics follow from fairly mild restrictions on the primitives. But
monotone dynamics are much harder to obtain in multi-sector models with heterogeneous agents
and real and financial frictions.
Several papers are concerned with the characterization of recursive equilibria for nonoptimal
economies. As already pointed out, these characterizations are model-dependent, and do not consider numerical implementation and approximation properties of these algorithms. Abreu, Pierce,
and Stacchetti (1990) introduce continuation utility values to find a recursive representation of
sequential equilibria for dynamic games. This characterization of equilibrium seems quite natural
in repeated games, but it may become computationally demanding in some other models. Duffie et
al. (1994) search for general representations of stationary equilibria over an expanded state space
that includes all endogenous variables such as asset prices and individual consumptions. Again,
expanding the state space over all state variables may slow down the computation process. Building upon these methods, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) show existence of a Markovian equilibrium
for a class of financial economies with collateral requirements. Their computations are based on
a projection-type algorithm iterating in the space of continuous functions. This computational
procedure cannot guarantee convergence to the true solution. Marcet and Marimon (2010) study a
general class of contracting problems with incentive constraints. Following Kydland and Prescott
(1980), they enlarge the state space with a vector of weights for the utility of each agent, and compute a transition for such weights from the shadow values of the agents’ participation constraints.
They assume that equilibrium solutions can be characterized by convex social planning problems.
By construction this method cannot capture multiple equilibria, but seems to be more operative
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for the computation of various dynamic incentive problems written in a Pareto-welfare form.
Our work is closest to Kubler and Schmedders (2003), but we consider a broader family of
economies that may include endogenous and exogenous borrowing constraints. In the numerical
implementation, we discretize our algorithm to preserve its convergence properties. Thus, unlike
Kubler and Schmedders (2003), we iterate over candidate equilibrium sets – rather than functions
– to guarantee convergence to the original equilibrium set. We can thus compute the set of all
competitive equilibria. As discussed below, this reliable discretization procedure can successfully
be applied to various types of models, and it seems particularly useful for OLG models and some
other infinite-horizon models with various types of real and financial frictions.
Section 2 considers two simple examples intended to highlight some major computational issues
and the workings of our algorithm. Section 3 introduces our framework of analysis. We provide a
general characterization of Markov equilibria for nonoptimal economies. The set of Markov equilibria is computed as the fixed-point of a monotone operator embedding all short-run equilibrium
conditions. This operator has good convergence and stability properties, and hence it provides the
foundations for the formulation of our reliable recursive equilibrium algorithm. Section 4 studies
the numerical implementation of our algorithm and its approximation properties. We apply these
numerical procedures to two types of models. Sections 5 is devoted to the numerical simulation of
a simple OLG model, and Section 6 considers a model of international trading with various market
frictions. We conclude in Section 7.

2.

Two Illustrative Examples

2.1.

An Overlapping Generations Economy

Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . At each date t a new consumer appears in the economy. Each
consumer receives an endowment e1 of a perishable good when young, and e2 when old. There is
a single asset called money that can be held for trading. This asset pays zero dividends, and it
belongs to the initial old generation starting the economy. The money supply M remains constant
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over time.
Let Pt be the price of money in terms of the aggregate good at date t. Then, a typical consumer
born in period t solves the following optimization problem:

max u(ctt ) + v(ctt+1 )
s.t.
Mt
Pt

ctt +

= e1

ctt+1 = e2 +

Mt
Pt+1 .

Note that cts denotes consumption at date s of the agent born at time t, for s = t, t + 1, and Mt
is the amount of money demanded at time t.
A sequential competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices {Pt } and sequences
of optimal choices {ctt , ctt+1 , Mt } for the given prices, such that both commodity and money markets
clear at all times:

(1)

ctt + ct−1
= e1 + e2
t

(2)

Mt = M,

for all t ≥ 0. For interior solutions, under the concavity of the objective function, the budgetconstrained optimal choice {ctt , ctt+1 , Mt } is fully characterized by the first-order conditions:

(3)

u0 (ctt ) = λt

(4)

v 0 (ctt+1 ) = λt+1
λt
Pt

(5)

=

λt+1
Pt+1 ,

where λt is a Lagrange multiplier at time t.
To analyze the dynamics of the model, we can indistinctly consider any of the following three
(state) variables: Consumption, ctt , the price level, Pt , or the amount of real money balances,
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bt ≡ M/Pt . That is, all these three variables provide the same information. Then, rearranging
all the above equations, equilibrium sequences {ctt , ctt+1 , Mt , Pt } can be fully characterized by the
equation:

bt u0 (e1 − bt ) = bt+1 v 0 (e2 + bt+1 ).

(6)

A standard approach for computing equilibrium solutions would be to search for a continuous
function g : X → X with bt+1 = g(bt ) for all t ≥ 0 and
bt u0 (e1 − bt ) = g(bt )v 0 (e2 + g(bt )).

(7)

We would like to stress that existence of a continuous equilibrium function bt+1 = g(bt ) requires
further assumptions on the model primitives. More specifically, a continuous equilibrium function
bt+1 = g(bt ) occurs under monotone equilibrium dynamics: An upward sloping offer curve arising
under the assumption of gross substitutes in consumption. But if the offer curve is backward
bending, then bt+1 = g(bt ) is just a correspondence, which may not have a continuous selection.
For instance, as is well known (Grandmont 1985) the offer curve is backward bending for the
following parameterization:

u (c) = c0.45 , v (c) = −

0.8 −7
c , M0 = 1, e1 = 2, e2 = 26/7 − 21/7 .
7

See Figure 1. Here, the upper and lower arms are two continuous equilibrium selections. As
illustrated in Section 5, there are other cases in which no continuous equilibrium selection does
exist.

5

Figure 1: Offer curve.
For this parameterization, we applied a version of the projection method over (7) to compute
a continuous policy bt+1 = g(bt ). Depending on the initial guess, the numerical approximation
converges either to the upper or the lower arm of the offer curve, or to some other hybrid solution.
This strong dependence on initial conditions is a rather undesirable feature of this computational
method. In particular, if we only consider the lower arm of the actual equilibrium correspondence
then all competitive equilibria converge to autarchy (zero monetary holdings). But if we iterate
over the upper arm of the offer curve, we find that money holdings converge monotonically to
the stationary solution

M̄
p

= 0.4181. Hence, even in the deterministic version, we need a global

approximation of the equilibrium correspondence to analyze the various predictions of the model.
As a matter of fact, none of these two selections would capture a two-period equilibrium cycle in
which real money holdings oscillate between 0.8529 and 0.0953 (see Figure 2). It is also known that
the model has a three-period cycle.

Figure 2: Equilibrium cycles.

As shown in Section 5, for certain parameterizations an OLG economy may not admit an
equilibrium function over the natural space of state variables. To compute the equilibrium set,
we could consider some auxiliary variables. One possible choice is to select continuation utilities
over the multiple equilibrium paths. Continuation utilities, however, will force us to discard the
first-order condition (6). Thus, from a computational point of view it seems optimal to build an
efficient numerical algorithm based upon (6).
6

Let us then define mt+1 as mt+1 =

bt+1 0
bt v (e2 + bt+1 ).

Now, equation (6) reduces to u0 (e1 − bt ) =

mt+1 . This simple equation seems much easier to compute. Accordingly, we propose to compute
the set of all equilibrium paths over an expanded state space (bt , mt ). In this expanded state
space we will define an equilibrium correspondence that generates all equilibrium paths. With this
background in place, let us further illustrate our computational method in the following example.

2.2.

Optimal Growth

Consider the infinite-horizon optimization problem

max{ct ,kt+1 }

P∞

t=0

β t u(ct )

s.t.
ct + kt+1 = F (kt , 1) + (1 − δ)kt
given k0 , 0 < β < 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1.

Under standard conditions for u and F, the solution to the above problem can be fully characterized
by the (infinite) set of Euler equations:

(8)

u0 (F (kt , 1) + (1 − δ)kt − kt+1 ) = βu0 (F (kt+1 , 1) + (1 − δ)kt+1 − kt+2 )(Fk (kt+1 , 1) + 1 − δ).

A common approach is to search for a continuous function kt+1 = g(kt ) over this time-homogeneous
non-linear system:

(9)

u0 (F (kt , 1) + (1 − δ)kt − g(kt )) =
βu0 (F (g(kt ), 1) + (1 − δ)g(kt ) − g(g(kt )))(Fk (g(kt ), 1) + 1 − δ)
for all t ≥ 0.

Under some specifications for the production function F , a continuous solution g may not exist
7

(cf. Boldrin and Rustichini 1994). For instance, in models with externalities, function F may be
written as F (k, 1) = f (k̂, k, 1), with k̂ = k at every equilibrium solution. As a matter of fact,
in non-convex programming the Euler equation may pick sub-optimal solutions. In those cases,
the set of optimal solutions may be characterized by continuation utilities or some other auxiliary
variables.
For simplicity, let us assume that the system of Euler equations (9) determines all equilibrium
solutions. Then, we cannot hope to find a recursive representation of equilibrium by conditioning on
variable k only. Indeed, for every k0 there is a continuum of vectors (k1 , k2 ) that satisfy the above
Euler equation (9). A recursive characterization of equilibrium, however, can readily be obtained
by letting the state space comprise equilibrium pairs (c, k). That is, for each (k0 , c0 ) the resource
constraint determines k1 ; further, c1 can be solved from the Euler equation. Therefore, for each
equilibrium pair (c, k) the Euler equation (9) generates a unique continuation value (k+ , c+ ). We
would like to stress that for computational purposes it may be more operative to expand the state
space with auxiliary variable m ≡ u0 (c)(Fk (k, 1) + 1 − δ), i.e. the shadow return of one unit of
investment. As in the preceding example, the Euler equation is linear in m. This will be useful in
the computation stage.
Let K be the domain of possible values for the capital stock and M the set of possible values
for m. We could start with space K × M as an initial guess for all starting equilibrium values.
Usually, this universal set is too broad: Many pairs (k, m) may lack continuation values (k+ , c+ )
over the above Euler equation (9). Each initial guess will be refined under the action of the following
operator B embedding all short-run equilibrium conditions.
Let V : K → M be a large enough correspondence of potential continuation values (k+ , m+ ).
For every k, let m ∈ B(V )(k) if there exists (c, k+ , m+ ) with m+ ∈ V (k+ ) such that

(10)

c + k+ = F (k, 1) + (1 − δ)k

(11)

u0 (c) = βm+ ,
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where m ≡ u0 (c)(Fk (k, 1) + 1 − δ). Correspondence V is chosen large enough2 so that the new
correspondence B(V ) is a subset of V . Then, by construction we obtain a decreasing sequence of
correspondences Vn+1 = B(Vn ) that converge to the equilibrium correspondence V ∗ . Therefore,
starting from each pair (k, m) ∈ graph(V ∗ ) we can generate a sequence of equilibrium solutions
{ct , kt+1 } satisfying the above equation system at all times. As a matter of fact, every sequential
equilibrium solution can be generated under some initial equilibrium pair (k, m) ∈ graph(V ∗ ).
To summarize, under the action of operator B, the recursive equilibrium algorithm finds a
Markov equilibrium correspondence V ∗ that can generate all (sequential) equilibrium solutions.
There are three main points to be emphasized from this exercise. First, the equilibrium correspondence is the maximal fixed point of operator B. That is, V ∗ = B(V ∗ ) and V 0 ⊂ V ∗ for any
other fixed point V 0 = B(V 0 ). Hence, under a proper formulation of the state space the existence
of a fixed point V ∗ is tantamount to the existence of a sequential equilibrium solution. Second,
the iteration process under operator B proceeds over correspondences rather than functions. While
iteration over correspondences may be computationally more costly, the recursive equilibrium algorithm guarantees convergence to the set of equilibrium solutions under a good initial guess V0 .
And third, the recursive equilibrium algorithm is subject to the curse of dimensionality, as it may
involve maximizations and integrations over spaces of functions, and set iterations. Indeed, some
characterizations of Markov equilibria may not be computable. Therefore, the choice of the state
space is usually critical. In the previous two examples, the state space has been enlarged with the
shadow values of investment.

3.

General Theory
In this section, we first set out a general analytical framework that encompasses various recursive

economic models. Their equilibrium time series, however, may depend on full histories of shocks
and economic variables. Therefore, these equilibria are not directly amenable to computation unless
2

Our method works under the weaker condition that V contains equilibrium correspondence V ∗ presently defined.
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we can find a Markovian representation over a well chosen state space. Then, we present a formal
version of our recursive algorithm. In Section 4 we develop a convergent numerical algorithm with
desirable approximation properties.
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), a recursive equilibrium representation is conformed
by “a transition mapping the state of the model today into the state tomorrow and a f unction
mapping the state into the other endogenous variables of the model.” Duffie et al. (1994) show
that under fairly general conditions it is possible to provide a recursive representation of sequential
competitive equilibria by expanding the state space with all endogenous variables. Their approach
does not cover models with endogenous constraints – nor does it provide a way to find or approximate
equilibria. Our analysis will be guided by computational considerations, and so it is imperative to
keep a manageable state space.

3.1.

General Framework

Time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . At every date t the economy is composed of I agents, and it
is shocked by a vector of exogenous variables z. This vector follows a Markov chain (zt )t≥0 over
n
o
a finite set Z = 1, 2, ..., Zb as described by transition probabilities π (z 0 |z) for all z, z 0 ∈ Z. The
initial state, z0 ∈ Z, is known to all agents in the economy. Then z t = (z0 , z1 , z2 , ..., zt ) ∈ Z t+1
is a history of shocks, often called a date-event or node. Endogenous predetermined variables are
denoted by x, with x ∈ X, X ⊂ RN . Vector x may include agents’ holdings of physical capital,
human capital, and financial assets. All other endogenous variables are denoted by y, with y ∈ Y,
Y ⊂ RL . Vector y may include equilibrium prices, choice variables such as consumption and
investment, and auxiliary variables such as Lagrange multipliers, shadow values of investment and
continuation utilities. Indeed, certain auxiliary variables may either be necessary or may allow for
a more operational representation of equilibrium.
In Section 6 below, our set of auxiliary variables includes shadow values of investment of each
existing asset for every agent, m ∈ M, M ⊂ RK , and continuation utilities, p ∈ RI , as is common in
the literature on incentive constraints. Agents will have the choice to default. It is thus necessary to
specify the payoff of default, which in our case implies permanent exclusion from commodities and
10

financial markets. Default carries a lifetime utility that may depend on the vectors of shocks z and
endogenous predetermined state variables x. When non-convexities arise from individual effects on
the aggregate state variables, first-order conditions cannot longer be invoked. Hence, computations
must consider global maximization methods. More precisely, each of the I agents in this economy
confronts an expected discounted lifetime utility given by a function P aut : RN × Z → RI in case
of default. This payoff function P aut may depend on both individual and aggregate state variables,
and may give rise to a non-concave individual optimization problem.
The thrust of our analysis is the computation of sequential competitive equilibria (SCE), as
described by infinite sequences {x(z t ), y(z t )}t≥0 . We limit this exercise to models where all SCE lie
in a compact space and can be characterized by aggregate resource constraints and short-run optimality conditions involving only variables of two contiguous time periods, t and t + 1. Specifically,
the law of motion of the state vector x is conformed by a system of non-linear equations:

(12)

ϕ (xt+1 , xt , yt , zt ) = 0.

Function ϕ may embed technological constraints as well as individual budget constraints. For some
models we can explicitly solve for xt+1 as a function of (xt , yt , zt ) . But in some other applications
such as in models with adjustment costs, xt+1 may not admit an analytical solution.
Further, a SCE {x(z t ), y(z t )}t≥0 must satisfy an infinite system:

(13)

(xt , yt , zt , xt+1 , yt+1 , zt+1 ) ∈ Φ

for all t ≥ 0. Functional Φ describes various short-run equilibrium conditions: (i) Euler equations, in which case Φ represents simply a non-linear system, (ii) one-period ahead constrainedoptimization to account for non-concave maximization programs because of real and financial distortions and additional participation constraints, (iii) market-clearing conditions, and (iv) various
types of budget restrictions and resource constraints.
We say that a model is recursive and time invariant if there exist functionals ϕ and Φ char-
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acterizing the set of all SCE under conditions (12-13). Several assumptions underlie this abstract
formulation.
First, the space of endogenous variables X × Y is compact. Hence, transversality conditions
at infinity are usually trivially satisfied. Section 6 below shows how a compact domain X × Y
may arise from optimization conditions in the presence of unbounded utility and production functions. Therefore, (12-13) must provide a set of sufficient conditions for the characterization of all
SCE. Second, (12-13) only involve variables at times t and t + 1. Hence, production and utility
functions, technological, borrowing, and incentive constraints, must satisfy certain intertemporal
separability assumptions. For instance, some forms of habit formation may be incorporated in the
analysis by including auxiliary variables. Third, (12-13) are time invariant. That is, we search
for a time-homogeneous Markovian representation of SCE, which will be given by an equilibrium
correspondence mapping current states into equilibrium values for each successor node.

3.2.

The Recursive Equilibrium Algorithm

The set of SCE may not admit a recursive representation over the standard state space comprising exogenous shocks z and predetermined endogenous variables x. To recover a recursive structure
it is necessary to enlarge the state space. The required expansion of the state space will depend
on the economic application. Hence, at this stage of our analysis we will simply assume that the
equilibrium values of the required vector of auxiliary variables are described by an equilibrium
correspondence V ∗ : (x, z) 7−→ V ∗ (x, z) ⊆ Y. This equilibrium correspondence may contain discontinuities and multiple equilibria. Under standard continuity conditions on utility and production
functions, the equilibrium correspondence is usually upper semicontinuous.
The theoretical underpinnings of our recursive equilibrium algorithm rest on the iteration of
monotone equilibrium inclusions (Kydland and Prescott 1980 and Abreu, Pierce and Stacchetti
1990) that lead to a convergent process. We first select an appropriate set of state variables, and
a well chosen initial correspondence V0 . Then, we apply a monotone operator, B, that generates
sequences of non-empty decreasing compact sets {Vn } shrinking to the equilibrium correspondence
V ∗ . Operator B embodies all short-run equilibrium conditions (12-13) from any initial value z to
12

all immediate successor nodes z+ . This operator is analogous to the expectations correspondence
of Duffie et al. (1994), albeit it may contain a smaller set of endogenous variables. Using operator
B, we can generate the set of all SCE under time-invariant equilibrium selections.
More precisely, for any given V under the action of operator B we obtain V 0 = B (V ). Correspondence V 0 is defined as follows. Pick a vector (x, z). Then, v ∈ V 0 (x, z) if there is a vector
(y, x+ , y+ (z+ ), v+ (z+ )) for all z+ ∈ Z, with v+ (z+ ) ∈ V (x+ , z+ ) such that the resulting vector
(x, y, z, x+ , y+ , z+ ) satisfies the temporary equilibrium conditions (12-13).
For models where a SCE exists, correspondence B(V ) will be non-empty provided that our
initial guess V0 has been properly chosen. Note that by construction operator B is monotone: If
V ⊂ V̂ then B(V ) ⊂ B(V̂ ).3 Further, under standard continuity conditions on functionals ϕ and Φ
it follows that if V has a closed graph then B(V ) will have a closed graph.
Assumption 3.1 Operator B preserves compactness: If V is compact valued then B(V ) is also
compact valued.
Assumption 3.1 will allow us to establish some uniform convergence properties of the algorithm.
This assumption could be weakened to show existence of a fixed-point solution V ∗ and the global
convergence of the iteration process.
Theorem 3.1 (existence and global convergence) Let V0 be a compact-valued correspondence such
that V0 ⊃ V ∗ . Let Vn = B (Vn−1 ) for all n ≥ 1. Then, operator B has a fixed-point solution, i.e.,
V ∗ = B(V ∗ ), where V ∗ = limn→∞ Vn . Moreover, V ∗ is the largest fixed point of operator B, i.e.,
V = B(V ) implies V ⊂ V ∗ .
We again would like to remark that operator B iterates over sets rather than functions. Hence,
if there are multiple equilibria we can find all of them. By definition, for any (x, z, v) ∈ graph(V ∗ ),
under the action of operator B we can generate a new vector (x+ , z+ , y, v+ ) that can be extended
3

For correspondences V, V̂ we say that V ⊂ V̂ if V (x, z) ⊂ V̂ (x, z) for all (x, z). We shall consider the usual

notion of distance over sets given by the Hausdorff metric.
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into a SCE {x(z t ), y(z t )}t≥0 . Since the fixed point of operator B is an upper semicontinuous correspondence, it is possible to select a measurable policy function y = g y (x, z, v), a transition function
v+ (z+ ) = g v (x, z, v; z+ ), and continuation values for the endogenous predetermined variables x+ so
that ϕ (x+ , x, y, z) = 0. Let us summarize these future equilibrium values over the extended state
space as g(x, z, v; z+ ) = (x+ , z+ , v+ ). Then, g is a Markovian equilibrium selection.4
To summarize, the set of SCE {x(z t ), y(z t )}t≥0 admits a recursive representation in an expanded
state space. Our recursive equilibrium algorithm rests upon iteration of sets under a monotone
operator B. For a well chosen initial correspondence, the iteration process converges to the Markov
equilibrium correspondence V ∗ . We now proceed to the numerical implementation of the algorithm
and to study its approximation properties.

4.

Numerical Implementation
In this section we develop a numerical implementation of operator B and study its convergence

and accuracy properties. For models with multiple equilibria, the fixed point of the numerical
algorithm converges unif ormly to the Markov equilibrium correspondence as the mesh size of the
discretization converges to zero. For models with a unique equilibrium, our results imply that the
accuracy of the numerical approximation is of the same order of magnitude as the mesh size of our
discretization.
For dynamic games, Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003), and Judd and Yeltekin (2010), develop an approximation procedure with good accuracy properties. Essentially, their approximation
method works well for convex equilibrium correspondences. The convexity of the equilibrium correspondence may be achieved via a public randomization device. Randomization over the original
set of strategies seems quite appealing in game theoretic settings. Such ex post convexification,
however, may arbitrarily expand the equilibrium set of a competitive economy, and may not be
4

It should be clear that g(·; z+ ) denotes a coordinate function of g(·) corresponding to the successor node z+ |z.
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compatible with individual optimization behavior. Note that by construction operator B is monotone, and maps compact sets into compact sets, but it does not preserve convexity.
We now proceed as follows. First, we partition the state space into a finite set of J simplices with
mesh size h. Compatible with this partition we consider a sequence of step correspondences, which
take constant set-values on each simplex. Step correspondences are the analog of step functions, and
have good approximation properties. We also introduce a finite-dimensional outer approximation
over the image of the step correspondences; this outer approximation is made up of Σ cubes or finitedimensional elements. Then, combining these approximations we obtain a computable operator
B h,Σ with accuracy parameters (h, Σ). Under the action of operator B h,Σ , we construct a sequence
of correspondences that converge to a fixed point containing equilibrium correspondence V ∗ . We
shall study accuracy properties of the algorithm as we refine our discretizations over (h, Σ).

4.1.

The Numerical Algorithm

Assume that all equilibrium state vectors (x, z, v) belong to some set S, which is a subset of the

J
product space S = X × Z × Y . Let X j j=1 be a finite family of simplices with non-empty interior
0

0

such that ∪j X j = X and int(X j ) ∩ int(X j ) is empty for every pair X j , X j . Define the mesh size
h of this discretization as

(14)


h = max diam X j .
j

For any multivalued mapping V : X × Z → 2Y , where 2Y denotes the subsets of vectors for space
Y containing the required auxiliary variables, an approximation V h compatible with the partition
 j
X takes on constant set-values V h (x, z) on each simplex X j . More precisely,

(15)

V h (x, z) = ∪x∈X j V (x, z), for each given z and all x ∈ X j .

This definition of step correspondence V h will include all equilibrium values and preserve the
monotonicity property over the discretized process. Analogously, over each Xj we define operator
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B h (V ) as B h (V )(x, z) = ∪x∈X j B(V )(x, z), for each given z and all x ∈ X j . As before, one
can prove that B h has a fixed-point solution. To obtain a computable representation of these
correspondences we also discretize the image space. For a given set V we say that C Σ (V ) ⊇ V
is an Σ-element outer approximation of V if C Σ (V ) can be generated by Σ elements. We require
this numerical representation to preserve monotonicity: V ⊂ V̂ implies C Σ (V ) ⊂ C Σ (V̂ ). This
is essential to guarantee monotonicity of a computable version of operator B. We also require
limΣ→∞ C Σ (V ) = V.
Combining these approximations, we can construct a new operator B h,Σ as follows. We first
define the step correspondence B h (V ) of B(V ). Then, each set-element of B h (V ) is adjusted by

the Σ-element outer approximation to get C Σ B h (V ) .
Therefore, the output of our numerical algorithm would be summarized by correspondences
Vnh,Σ under the action of a globally convergent operator B h,Σ . From the application of operator
B h,Σ on Vnh,Σ , we can choose an approximate policy function y = gny,h,Σ (x, z, v), and a transition
function v+ (z+ ) = gnv,h,Σ (x, z, v; z+ ). From the computed selections we can generate approximate
SCE paths {xt (z t ), yt (z t )}∞
t=0 . Sections 5 and 6 illustrate examples of such operators, and their
application to different dynamic models.

4.2.

Convergence and Accuracy Properties

We finally show that our discretized operator B h,Σ has good convergence properties: The fixed
point of this operator V ∗,h,Σ contains equilibrium correspondence V ∗ , and it converges uniformly
to this limit point as we refine the approximations. The proof of this result extends the convergence
arguments of Beer (1980) to a dynamic setting.
h,Σ
Theorem 4.1 For given h, Σ, let V0 ⊇ V ∗ . Let Vnh,Σ = B h,Σ (Vn−1
) for all n ≥ 1. Then, (i)

Vnh,Σ ⊇ V ∗ for all n; (ii) Vnh,Σ → V ∗,h,Σ as n → ∞; and (iii) V ∗,h,Σ → V ∗ as h → 0 and Σ → ∞.
As stated in the theorem, three points are to be emphasized from these results. First, the
set of numerical solutions always contains the equilibrium correspondence. Second, the iteration
process is globally convergent. And third, as we refine these approximations, the fixed point of our
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numerical algorithm shrinks to the equilibrium correspondence.
We now establish uniform convergence over accuracy parameters (h, Σ). Hence, the approximation error is directly correlated with the mesh size of the discretizations. For correspondences Vnh,Σ
and V , consider the distance d(graph(Vnh,Σ ), graph(V )), where d refers to the Hausdorff metric.
Theorem 4.2 Under the conditions of Theorem 4.1, for any given  > 0 there are Σ̂, ĥ, n̂ such that
the distance d(graph(Vnh,Σ ), graph(V ∗ )) ≤  for all Σ ≥ Σ̂, h ≤ ĥ, n ≥ n̂ .
Hence, for any sufficiently close discretization (Σ, h, n), all approximate solutions (x, z, v) are
within an -ball of graph(V ∗ ); further, an -ball of graph(Vnh,Σ ) contains graph(V ∗ ). This important
approximation result comes directly from the construction of our numerical operator B h,Σ that
preserves equilibrium solutions and compactness over the iteration process. As already remarked,
if the equilibrium correspondence V ∗ is just a function, then Theorem 4.2 implies the existence of
error bounds for the approximate solutions. Indeed, these bounds follow directly from the size of
the errors of the discretization procedure under parameters (h, Σ).

5.

Stochastic OLG Economies
OLG models have become quite relevant in the analysis of several macro issues, such as the fund-

ing of social security, the optimal profile of savings and investment over the life cycle, the effects of
various fiscal and monetary policies, and the evolution of future interest rates and asset prices under
current demographic trends.5 As already stressed, there are no known convergent procedures for
the computation of sequential competitive equilibria in OLG models even for frictionless economies
with complete financial markets. Our approach delivers a reliable, computable algorithm for the
5

For instance, see Conesa, Krueger and Kitao (2009), Geanakoplos, Magill and Quinzii (2003), Gourinchas and

Parker (2002), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), Storelesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), and Ventura
(1999).
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solution of competitive equilibria in a general class of OLG models. As shown below, the application
of standard numerical methods that build on the existence of a continuous policy function is not
adequate for the computation of these economies. Indeed, a continuous Markov equilibrium may
not exist – or there could be a vast multiplicity of equilibria. Citanna and Siconolfi (2010) establish
generic existence of this Markovian property of equilibrium under the additional assumption that
the number of agents is sufficiently large. Of course, for computational reasons many economies of
practical interest contain a limited number of agents which are given as model primitives; further,
this recursive representation is not necessarily continuous.

5.1.

The Economic Environment

At each date a new generation made up of 2 agents appears in the economy. Each agent is alive
for 2 periods. Let (i, z t ) denote an agent of type i = 1, 2 born at date-event z t = (z0 , z1 , · · · , zt ).
There are 2 perishable commodities available for consumption at any given date-event. Let good
1 be the numeraire commodity, and p the relative price of good 2. There are two assets. The first
asset is a one-period risk-free bond trading at price q b (z t ). The second is a Lucas tree, trading at
t

t

price q s (z t ). The tree generates a random stream of dividends d(zt ). Let (θb,i,z , θs,i,z ) be a pair of
t

bond and share holdings of agent (i, z t ) . Shares cannot be sold short: θs,i,z ≥ 0. Each individual
faces the following budget constraint:

(16)

t

t

t

t

p(z t ) · ci,z (z t ) + θb,i,z (z t )q b (z t ) + θs,i,z (z t )q s (z t ) ≤ p(z t ) · ei,z (zt )

t

t

t

t

(17) p(z t+1 )·ci,z (z t+1 ) ≤ θb,i,z (z t )+θs,i,z (z t )[d(zt+1 )+q s (z t+1 )]+p(z t+1 )·ei,z (z t+1 ) all z t+1 |z t .

The utility function U i is separable over consumptions of different dates:

(18)

 t

 t
 t

X
 


U i ci,z ; z t , z t+1 = ui ci,z z t , zt + β
v i ci,z z t+1 , zt+1 π z t+1 |z t .
z t+1 ∈Z
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Assumption 5.1 For each z ∈ Z the one-period utility functions ui (·, z), v i (·, z) : R+ → R∪{−∞}
are increasing, strictly concave, and continuous. These functions are also continuously differentiable
at every interior point c > 0.


2

t
t
t
, p(z t ), q (z t )
As before, a SCE is a collection of vectors
ci,z (z t ) , ci,z z t+1 , θi,z (z t )
i=1
t≥0
n t
o
i,z
t
i,z t t+1
i,z t t
such that each consumption-savings plan c (z ), c (z ), θ (z ) solves the constrainedutility maximization of the agent, and goods and assets markets clear.
Note that in this economy the aggregate commodity endowment is bounded by a portfoliotrading plan (Santos and Woodford 1997), and hence asset pricing bubbles cannot exist in a SCE.
Therefore, equilibrium asset prices must be bounded at each date. It follows that the existence of
a SCE can be established by standard methods (e.g., Balasko and Shell 1980, and Schmachtenberg
1988).

5.2.

Lack of Recursive Equilibria on the Natural State Space

Let us first discuss the model specification of Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) where the real
asset is not available. The intertemporal objective of agent of type 1 is given by

−



1024
1024
1


4 −  t
4 
4 + Ezt+1 |zt −  t
1,z t
1,z
1,z
c1
c1 (zt+1 )
c2 (zt+1 )

while that of agent of type 2 is given by

−

1
c2,z
1


 + Ezt+1 |zt − 
t 4


1

1024

−

4  .
4
2,z t
2,z t
c1 (zt+1 )
c2 (zt+1 )

Each individual receives a random endowment of good 1 in their first period of life. Specifically,
t

t

t

t

1,z
2,z
2,z
e1,z
1 (zt ) = 10.4, e1 (zt ) = 2.6 if zt = z1 , and e1 (zt ) = 8.6313, e1 (zt ) = 4.3687 if zt = z2 .

Endowments during the second period of life are deterministic and include positive amounts of both
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goods. Namely, e1,z

t



t
z t+1 = (12, 1) and e2,z z t+1 = (1, 12) .

Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) show that bond holdings turn out to be equal to zero in the two
states. To determine consumption when old we must know the realization of the endowment when
young.6 Bond holdings and current shocks are not enough to pin down the dynamic behavior of
equilibrium. In other words, the model does not admit a Markov equilibrium representation over the
natural state space. The specific configuration of equilibrium is as follows: At any state history z t−1
 t−1

t−1
with zt−1 = z1 , and for any possible value of the shock today c1,z
(z t ) , c1,z
(z t ) = (10.4, 2.6),
1
2
 t−1

t−1
c2,z
(z t ) , c22,z (z t ) = (2.6, 10.4), and q = 1, p = 1. Likewise, for any state history z t−1 with
1
 t−1

t−1
zt−1 = z2 , and for any possible value of the shock today c1,z
(z t ) , c1,z
(z t ) = (8.4, 1.4),
1
2
 t−1

t−1
c2,z
(z t ) , c22,z (z t ) = (4.6, 11.6) , and q = 1, p = 7.9.
1
What would happen if we approximate this economy by standard methods? To answer this
question we applied a projection method with collocation and piecewise linear interpolation. This
collocation method approximates the Euler equation to search for a continuous equilibrium function
over the natural state space. The computed equilibrium function delivers reasonable Euler equation
residuals (i.e., of the order of 10−5 ) and a researcher may be led to believe that this function is a
good approximate solution; however, the computed prices and allocations are quite different from
those of the exact equilibrium; see Table 1.

c1,z
1

t−1

c1,z
2

t−1

c2,z
1

t−1

c2,z
2

t−1

Statistics

q

(µtrue , µprojection )

(1.0,0.6)

(9.7,9.7)

(2.0,1.7)

(3.6,3.8)

(11.0,11.3)

2
2
, σprojection
)
(σtrue

(0.0,0.05)

(1.0,0.2)

(0.36,0.81)

(1.0,0.09)

(0.36,0.08)

Table 1: Statistical properties of the true equilibrium vs. an equilibrium generated by the
projection method. Statistics: Mean µ and variance σ 2 .

The relative price of good 2 is a function of the endowment in the previous period. The price
6

Because of an indeterminacy problem of the Euler equation, we can approximate the equilibrium of this more

limited economy by letting the stock of trees go to zero.
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is not signaled by the natural state space as there is no trade among generations. The equilibrium
relative price of good 2 can take on two values and asset holdings take on one single value. This
observation may explain the large differences in Table 1 between the simulated moments generated
by the true and computed solutions. Indeed, the computed function by the projection method
takes on a single value for the relative price of good 2 midway between the two possible equilibrium
values.

5.3.

The Recursive Equilibrium Algorithm

A recursive representation of equilibria can be readily recovered on an enlarged state space composed of the natural state variables and the shadow values of investment as auxiliary variables. For
the present economy of Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004), the Markov equilibrium correspondence
can be defined as follows:







0
0
Dc v 1 (c1,z (z0 ) , z0 ), Dc v 2 (c2,z (z0 ) , z0 ) :


(19) V ∗ (θ0 , z0 ) =

 2
t
t
t

ci,z (z t ) , ci,z z t+1 |z t , θi,z z t+1
, p(z t ), q (z t )

i=1




t≥0

.

is a SCE 


Operator B will build on the first-order and market-clearing conditions. After some algebra,
these conditions can be written as:

(20)
(21)

12 + p + θ 4 + 48p − 4θ
+
= 13
4p1/5 + p
p1/5 + 4p
1 − π[z+ = z1 |z]
q
π[z+ = z1 |z]
=
+

5
5
5
12+p(z+ )+θ+
12+p(z+ )+θ+
(e11 (z) − qθ)
1+0.25p(z+ )4/5

(22)

q
(e21 (z)

5

+ qθ)

=

1+0.25p(z+ )4/5

π[z+ = z1 |z]
1 − π[z+ = z1 |z]
5 + 
5 .

1+12p(z+ )−θ+
1+4p(z+ )4/5

1+12p(z+ )−θ+
1+4p(z+ )4/5

Then, for each given (z, θ), and m ∈ V (z, θ) we have that m ∈ BV (z, θ) if there are (q, p, z+ , θ+ , m (z+ ))
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such that
12 + p + θ 4 + 48p − 4θ
+
= 13
4p1/5 + p
p1/5 + 4p
q
1
5 = Em+
1
(e1 (z) − qθ)
q
2
5 = Em+ .
2
(e1 (z) + qθ)

(23)
(24)
(25)

The numerical implementation of our recursive equilibrium algorithm is quite simple in this
model. The only equilibrium portfolio is θ = 0. However, to test the algorithm we consider a
slightly larger domain [θ, θ], with θ < 0 < θ. Our family of simplices is given by the set of N
intervals of the form [θ + nh, θ + (n + 1)h], for n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, and h is such that θ = θ + N h. The
only equilibrium price for the bond is q = 1. This value together with the definition of the shadow
values of investment are now used to set up our discretization for the initial step correspondence.
Let θ ∈[θ + nh, θ + (n + 1)h]. Then
h
i
S
1
1
V0h,Σ (θ, z) = i,j {(m1 , m2 ) ∈ e1 (z)−(θ+nh)−iΣ
, e1 (z)−(θ+nh)−(i+1)Σ
h
i
1
1
× e2 (z)+(θ+(n+1)h)−jΣ
, e2 (z)+(θ+(n+1)h)−(j+1)Σ
}
for i = 1, ..., Ni , j = 1, ..., Nj , and e1 (z) − (θ + nh) − (Ni + 1)Σ = (θ + (n + 1)h), and e2 (z) +
(θ + (n + 1)h) − (Nj + 1)Σ = e2 (z) + (θ + nh). This specification is also very convenient because
we have partitioned the image of the correspondence into Ni × Nj pieces at each element of the
simplex of the domain of asset holdings. Iteration of operator B h,Σ will eliminate those pieces that
cannot be linked to a continuation value. After k iterations, correspondence Vkh,Σ is conformed
by the union of those pieces that have not been eliminated. Operator B h,Σ is then defined as
h,Σ
follows: For any given simplex, an element (i, j) of Vkh,Σ remains in B h,Σ Vkh,Σ = Vk+1
if there is at
h
i
1
1
, e1 (z)−(θ+nh)−(i+1)Σ
×
least one θ ∈ [θ + nh, θ + (n + 1)h], and a pair (m1 , m2 ) ∈ e1 (z)−(θ+nh)−iΣ
h
i
1
1
e2 (z)+(θ+(n+1)h)−jΣ , e2 (z)+(θ+(n+1)h)−(j+1)Σ for which we can find (q, p, z+ , θ+ , m (z+ )) satisfying

conditions (23-25).
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6.

International Risk Sharing
A growing literature has developed to explore the performance of business cycle models under

market imperfections leading to limited risk sharing. As documented in various papers (e.g., Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland 1992), standard versions of the neoclassical growth model cannot account for
certain co-movements of macroeconomic aggregates. We now show that our reliable algorithm can
naturally be applied to the computation of two-country models with real and financial frictions.

6.1.

The Economic Environment

We just outline an economy in the spirit of Kehoe and Perri (2002) in which we include shocks
on preferences and taxes. There are two countries with a representative household in each country.
Each economy is affected by a vector of shocks z that follow a Markov chain. There is a unique
aggregate good. Production technologies are country specific. Labor and capital stocks cannot be
moved across countries, but limited international borrowing is possible. Assets include physical
capital and bonds.
The representative household of country i = 1, 2 has preferences over stochastic sequences of
consumption and labor given by the utility function
"
(26)

E

∞
X

#
t i

β u

cit , lti , zt



.

t=0

Function ui (·, ·, zt ) : R2 → R is increasing in ci ≥ 0 and decreasing in li ∈ [0, 1], strictly concave, and

twice continuously differentiable. Stochastic consumption plans cit t≥0 are financed by commodity
endowments, after-tax capital returns, labor income, and lump-sum transfers. These values are
expressed in terms of the single good, which is taken as the numeraire commodity of the system
at each date-event, z t . For a given rental rate rti and wage wti in country i, the representative
household offers kti (z t−1 ) ≥ 0 units of capital accumulated from the previous period, and supplies
lti (z t ) units of labor.
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l
One-period bonds can be traded at all times. Let bi (z t , ξt+1
(z t )) denote bond holdings of agent
l
i, where ξt+1
(z t ) is a representative element of a given partition of the possible successors z t+1 |z t .
0

l
l
l
Hence, ∪l ξt+1
(z t ) equals the set of all z t+1 |z t , and ξt+1
(z t ) ∩ ξt+1
(z t ) = 0 whenever l0 6= l. A bond
l
is a promise to deliver 1 unit of the consumption good whenever z t+1 ∈ ξt+1
(z t ), and 0 otherwise.
l
This specification allows for a full set of state contingent bonds if ξt+1
(z t ) is a unique element

for each l. An uncontingent bond pays one unit of the good for any possible future state. Let
l
q(z t , ξt+1
(z t )) be the price of a bond issued at z t .

The representative household of country i is subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:

(27)

i
l
l
cit (z t ) + kt+1
(z t ) + bi (z t , ξt+1
(z t ))q(z t , ξt+1
(z t )) = wti (z t ) lti (z t ) +


(1 − τki (K i ))rti (z t ) kti z t−1 + (1 − δ) kti z t−1 + eit (zt ) + bi (z t−1 , ξtl (z t−1 )) + Tti (z t ) ,

for all z t , t ≥ 0, given k0i .
Endowments eit (z t ) are strictly positive and depend only on the current realization of the shock
zt . Capital income is taxed according to function τk , which may depend on the aggregate capital
stock, Kti , or some other state variables. This tax function is assumed to be positive, continuous, and
bounded away from 1. Tax revenues are rebated back to the representative consumer as lump-sum
transfers Tti (z t ) = τki (K i )rti (z t ) Kti (z t ) .
As in Kehoe and Perri (2002), we consider two scenarios for financial markets. A debt-constrained
economy and a liquidity-constrained economy. In the debt-constrained economy, consumers have a
complete menu of contingent bonds. Financial markets would be therefore complete, except for the
fact that there are constraints on debt holdings. Debt repudiation is possible and entails permanent exclusion from financial markets. As a result, holdings of debt are constrained by the following
individually rational constraint at every possible node z t :

(28)

Ezt

∞
X

βi

τ


i
ui ciτ , lτi , zτ ≥ V i,aut (Kt−1
(z t ), z t ), for all t ≥ 0.

τ =t
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Here, V i,aut is the expected discounted utility value for autarky as a result of zero bond trading for
i
country i at all dates after z t . Hence, Kt−1
(z t ) is the average level of physical capital of country i

starting at node z t . It is important to stress that the representative agent in each country makes
i
choices on their capital holdings, kti , assuming that the average value of the stock of capital Kt−1

is given. As is typical in many models with externalities, no individual agent realizes that her
choices affect the aggregate borrowing constraint (28). Therefore, in this setting the constraint set
is convex, and so the first-order approach can be used to characterize equilibria.
In the liquidity-constrained economy, households can trade quantities bi (z t ) of a single uncontingent bond that yields one unit of the commodity for all states, subject to the following exogenous
constraint:

bi (z t ) ≥ −Ωi ,

(29)

where Ωi > 0.
Because of constant-returns-to-scale technologies, we can focus on the problem of a representative firm without loss of generality. After observing the current shock z the firm rents K i units
of capital and hires Li units of labor. The total quantity produced of the single aggregate good is


given by a production function Ait F Kti , Lit , where Ait is a TFP index and F Kti , Lit is the direct
contribution of the firm’s inputs to the production of the aggregate good. At every date-event z t
factors of production are demanded by the firm to the point in which the marginal productivity of
capital equals the rental rate rti and the marginal productivity of labor equals the wage wti . We
shall maintain the following standard conditions on production function F . Let D1 F (K, L) be the
derivative of F with respect to K.
Assumption 6.1 F : R+ × R+ → R+ is increasing, concave, continuous, and linearly homogeneous.

This function is continuously differentiable at each interior point (K, L); moreover,

limK→∞ D1 F (K, L) = 0 for all L > 0.
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6.2.

Competitive Equilibrium

Definition 6.1 A SCE is a tax function τki (K), and a collection of vectors
i
l
i
l
{cit (z t ), lti (z t ), kt+1
(z t ), bi (z t , ξt+1
(z t )), Kt+1
(z t ), Lit (z t ), rti (z t ), wti (z t )}i=1,2 , q(z t , ξt+1
(z t ))


t≥0

that

satisfy the following conditions:
i
(i) Constrained-utility maximization: For i = 1, 2 the sequence {cit , lti , kt+1
, bit }t≥0 solves the

maximization problem for the objective (26) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (27),
as well as constraint (28) for the debt-constrained economy, and constraint (29) for the liquidityconstrained economy.
(ii) Market clearing in all the markets: Goods, capital, labor, and bond markets.
We are just extending the definition of SCE of Kehoe and Perri (2002) with the addition of
taxes. Note that in this economy international borrowing allows for imports of the aggregate good
produced abroad – available for consumption and investment – but the representative firm can only
hire local inputs – capital and labor.
There does not seem to be a general proof of existence of competitive equilibria for infinitehorizon economies with distortions. We are aware of a related contribution by Jones and Manuelli
(1999), but their analysis is not directly applicable to models with incomplete markets or externalities. Hence, the Appendix outlines a proof of the following result.
Proposition 6.2 A SCE exists.

6.3.

Bounds on Equilibrium Allocations and Prices

The Appendix shows existence of positive constants K max and K min such that for every equilibrium
P2
i
sequence of physical capital vectors {kt+1
(z t ))}t≥0 if K max ≥ i=1 k0i (z 0 ) ≥ K min then K max ≥
P2
i
t
min
for all z t . Hence, in what follows the domain of aggregate capital will be
i=1 kt+1 (z ) ≥ K
restricted to the interval [K min , K max ]. We also show that every equilibrium sequence of factor
prices {rti (z t ), wti (z t )}t≥0 is bounded.
26

To build operator B, we need to bound the equilibrium shadow values of investment. For this
purpose, we introduce the following dynamic programming argument: We define an auxiliary value
function of an individual sequential optimization problem. For a given sequence of factor and bond
prices and aggregate capital (r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) = {rt (z t ), wt (z t ), qt (z t ) , Kt+1 (z t )}t≥0 ,
let

(30)

J i (k0i , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) = max E

∞
X

β t ui (ct (z t ), lt (z t ), zt )

t=0

subject to the sequence of budget constraints (27), as well as constraint (28) for the debt-constrained
economy, and constraint (29) for the liquidity-constrained economy, for given initial conditions
k0i , bi0 . That is, J i (k0i , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) is the maximum utility attained for initial
k0i , bi0 , over an expected future sequence of equilibrium prices and tax rebates.

For every bounded sequence (r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )), the value function J i (k0i , z0 , bi0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )
is well defined, and continuous. Moreover, mapping J i (·, ·, z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) is increasing, concave, and differentiable with respect to k0i and bi0 (cf. Rincon-Zapatero and Santos
2009). Let
Dk,b J i (·, ·, z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) be the partial derivative of function
J i (·, ·, z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) with respect to (k0 , b0 ). Then,
Dk,b J i (·, ·, z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) varies continuously with
(k0i , bi0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )). The next result readily follows from these regularity properties
of the value function.
Proposition 6.3 For all SCE
i
l
i
{cit (z t ), lti (z t ), kt+1
(z t ), bi (z t , ξt+1
(z t )), Kt+1
(z t ), Lit (z t ), rti (z t ), wti (z t )}i=1,2 ,


t≥0

with K max ≥

P2

i=1

K min , there is a constant vector γ
b = (γ, γ) for γ > 0 such that
0 ≤ Dk,b J i (·, ·, z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) ≤ γ
b for all z t .
The proof is sketched in the Appendix. Observe that these bounds apply to the following
types of utility functions: (i) Both function u(·, ·, z) and its derivative are bounded; (ii) function
u(·, ·, z) is bounded, and its derivative function is unbounded; and (iii) both function u(·, ·, z) and
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k0i (z 0 ) ≥

its derivative are unbounded. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) deal with case (i) and Kubler and
Schmedders (2003) consider utility functions of type (iii). We provide a uniform method of proof
that covers all three cases, as well as production functions with bounded and unbounded derivatives,
and exogenous and endogenous constraints. As a matter of fact, Proposition 6.3 fills an important
gap in the literature for production economies with heterogeneous consumers and market frictions,
since no general results are available on upper and lower bounds for equilibrium allocations and
prices.
For any initial distribution of capital k0 = (k01 , k02 ), bonds b0 = (b10 , b20 ) and a given shock z0 ,
the shadow values of investment that belong to the equilibrium correspondence are defined as

(31)

V ∗ (k0 , b0 , z0 ) =





 {Dk,b J i (k i , bi , z0 , r0 (z ), w (z ), q(z ), K(z ))}i=1,2 : 
0 0
0
0 0
0
0
There is a SCE




.




Hence, the set V ∗ (k0 , b0 , z0 ) contains all current equilibrium shadow values of investment returns
mi0 , for every household i.
Corollary 6.4 Correspondence V ∗ is non-empty, compact-valued, and upper semicontinuous.
This corollary is a straightforward consequence of Propositions 6.2 and 6.3. These bounds insure
that our operator B maps compact sets into compact sets [cf., Assumption 3.1]. The construction
of B follows the same steps of the preceding section.

6.4.

The Recursive Equilibrium Algorithm

The natural state space is conformed by the space of shocks and the distribution of wealth (namely,
individual country holdings of the capital stock and bonds). Because of financial and real frictions,
auxiliary variables are also needed to guarantee a recursive representation of equilibria. For the
economy with exogenous debt limits we enlarge the state space with the shadow values of investment.
For the economy with endogenous debt limits we enlarge the state space with both the shadow values
of investment, m, and values of participation, p.
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l
l
Note that in equilibrium b1 (z t , ξt+1
(z t )) = −b2 (z t , ξt+1
(z t )). Hence, in the sequel we let b be

the share holdings of country 1. Then, the equilibrium correspondence V ∗ (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) is a map
from the space of possible values for each country’s capital stock and shocks, and bond holdings for
agent 1, into the set of possible equilibrium values for the auxiliary variables.
For the economy with exogenous constraints, both b, q are scalars, and the shadow values of
investment are defined as:

(32)


mik (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) = Ai (z i )Fk (k i , li ) + (1 − δ) uic

(33)

mib (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) = quic .

We can now build operator B from the first-order and market-clearing conditions. For any pair
of equilibrium values for the shadow values of investment (m1 , m2 ) ∈ V ∗ (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), there must
1
2
be bond prices q, multipliers λ, tomorrow’s bond holdings, b+ , capitals, k+
, k+
, and shadow values
2
1
2
1
) such that the short-run equilibrium conditions
, z+
, z+
, k+
of investment (m1+ , m2+ ) ∈ V ∗ (b+ , k+

(34)

uic = λi + β i Emi+

(35)

uic Ai FL = uil

are satisfied. Here λi ≥ 0, with strict inequality only if today’s borrowing constraint binds. As
before, E is the expectations operator.
Analogously, for the economy with endogenous constraints, given a tuple of equilibrium shadow
values of investment and participation, (m1 , m2 , p1 , p2 ) ∈ V ∗ (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), it must be possible
to find continuation values that satisfy the following short-run equilibrium conditions:

(36)

i
uic = ζ i β i π[z+
|z i ]mi+

(37)

uic Ai FL = uil

(38)

pi = u + β i Epi+.
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In the Euler equation above, ζ i ≥ 1 is a ratio of multipliers corresponding to the participation
constraints. Therefore, ζ i > 1 only if tomorrow’s participation constraint is binding.
As before, we start with a correspondence V0 ⊇ V ∗ . It is easy to bound this initial candidate
V0 , since the lowest value of the endowment is a lower bound for consumption, and the marginal
utility of consumption can be used to bound asset prices as discounted values of dividends. It is
also straightforward to derive bounds for the value of participation p0 .
For the purposes of presentation, let us just deal with the scenario of the exogenous borrowing
constraint (29) where values of participation are not required. For given (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), operator
B dictates that (m1 , m2 ) ∈ BVn (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) if we can find continuation shadow values of
1
2
1
2
investment (m1+ , m2+ ) ∈ Vn (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
), a bond price q, and multipliers (λ1 , λ2 ), such that

optimality conditions (34-35) are satisfied. If we cannot find continuation values that satisfy the
previous conditions, then (m1 , m2 ) ∈
/ BVn (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ). A new correspondence Vn+1 = B(Vn ) is
defined after proceeding with these computations over every possible value (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ).
Iterating over operator B we get new candidate values for the shadow values of investment
and values for participation over the short-run equilibrium conditions (36-38). Our algorithm can
then be used to generate a sequence of approximations to the equilibrium correspondence via the
recursion Vn+1 = B(Vn ).
For the numerical implementation of the algorithm, we assume pre-specified intervals for the
values of bond and capital holdings. We then partition the state space over a set of vertex points
with grid size h. The step correspondence approximating V0 over each element in the partition of
1
2
the state sijl ≡ [bi , bi+1 ] × [kj1 , kj+1
] × [kl2 , kl+1
] can be defined as

(39)

V0h (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) = ∪(b,k1 ,k2 ,z1 ,z2 )∈sijl V0 (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ).

The image of this correspondence comprises the shadow values of investment (m1 , m2 ). Hence,

a simple outer approximation C Σ B h (V ) would be a finite collection of hypercubes for vectors
(m1 , m2 ). This completes the numerical implementation of operator B h,Σ , defined over computable
step correspondences.
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We use our method to compute SCE of this two-country model with endogenous and exogenous
borrowing constraints. In both scenarios we find that the equilibrium correspondence converges to
a function (up to numerical accuracy of 10−6 ), which indicates that the SCE is unique for given
initial conditions. This is the only model of the paper where computational time is a substantial
issue. The basic form of our algorithm is fairly easy to implement: It only requires to search
for continuation values over the short-run equilibrium conditions required by operator B. As this
process of search is independent across states, it is straightforward to use parallel computing. In
terms of running times, as in most algorithms the choice of initial guess matters greatly. The
initial guess we employed was the solution of a similar economy but with complete markets and no
distortions, which can easily be secured with a standard dynamic programming algorithm. Our grid
considers 51 equally spaced points for K and 501 points for m for each country i = 1, 2. We ran our
C++ MPI code using an IBM Server 1350 Cluster, with 50 Xeon 2.3GHZ processors. The average
time per iteration of operator B was 24 minutes. The program took 94 iterations to converge to a
desired level of accuracy. These times were lower in the liquidity-constrained economy.

6.5.

Quantitative Experiments

We now explore the quantitative implications of the above two financial scenarios. For comparison
purposes we will also report results for the model with complete markets to be solved under standard
dynamic programming techniques.
We assume a one-period utility with stochastic shock ν i (z):

(40)

 η
1−σ
c (1 − l)1−η
u (c, l, z) = ν (z)
,
1−σ
i

i

and a Cobb-Douglas production function:

(41)

AF (K, L) = AK α (L)1−α .
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We shall use the following standard parameter values: α = 0.36, η = 0.36, and σ = 2. From quarterly data, we let β = 0.99 and δ = 0.025. We consider a discrete VAR process for the technology
shocks with four possible states: (A1 = 0.95613, A2 = 0.95613), (A1 = 0.95613, A2 = 1.04480),
(A1 = 1.04480, A2 = 0.95613), (A1 = 1.04480, A2 = 1.04480). These states evolve according to the
transition matrix


0.83022



 0.10821

π=

 0.10971

0.01354

0.07849

0.07803

0.77567

0.00865

0.00793

0.77629

0.07934

0.07960

0.01326





0.10747 

.

0.10607 

0.82752

Table 2 reports the simulated moments for the complete-markets economy, the debt-constrained
economy, and the liquidity-constrained economy in which the borrowing limit Ωi = 0. The resulting
simulated sample moments are in line with those reported in Kehoe and Perri (2002) who use a
slightly different calibration and a different computational method.
Only the debt-constrained economy offers a chance of generating reasonable correlations. In the
first three scenarios, preferences are non-stochastic (ν(z) = 1), and there are no taxes (τ = 0). The
last column of Table 2 reports a slightly different experiment for the liquidity-constrained economy
with stochastic preferences and taxes. The idea is to see how shocks on preferences and taxes may
improve the performance of the liquidity-constrained economy. We assume that ν i = 1.05 if Ai > 1,
and ν i = 0.95 if Ai ≤ 1. Hence, the representative household is more optimistic (or more willing
to consume) in the event of a good productivity shock. Also, τ i = 0.30 if Ai > 1, and τ i = 0.25
if Ai ≤ 1. That is, taxes are also procyclical. With respect to the liquidity-constrained economy,
this last calibration improves some of the bilateral correlations; still, it does not do as well for the
correlations of consumption c and GDP .
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Bilateral
correlations
Consumption
GDP
Investment
Labor

Data

complete
markets

liquidity
constrained

debt
constrained

pref erences/tax
shocks

0.32
0.51
0.29
0.43

0.8003
−0.5947
−0.9117
−0.9341

-0.8767
-0.7568
−0.9953
-0.8714

0.2264
0.0170
0.6037
−0.1062

-0.36
-0.28
0.41
0.19

Table 2: Statistical properties of the economies with complete markets, and with exogenous or
endogenous constraints.

In summary, in this section we apply our reliable algorithm to a two-country general equilibrium
model with several real and financial frictions: Incomplete markets, exogenous and endogenous constraints, preference shocks, and taxes. We establish bounds for equilibrium allocations and prices as
a key condition for the numerical implementation of our algorithm. Our model simulations broadly
confirm the findings of Kehoe and Perri (2002): Endogenous debt constraints seem instrumental to
fix some international business cycles anomalies. We here obtain a related result with procyclical
preference shocks and taxation to improve the cross-country correlation of capital and labor. Our
computational method can accommodate some other extensions (e.g., time-to-build, adjustment
costs), or can be applied to related models of international investment (Bai and Zhang 2010).

7.

Concluding Remarks

This paper provides a theoretical framework for the numerical simulation of dynamic competitivemarket economies in which the welfare theorems may fail to hold because of market frictions or
the existence of an infinite number of generations. This includes various macroeconomic models
with heterogeneous agents, incomplete financial markets, endogenous and exogenous borrowing
constraints, taxes, and money. Equilibrium solutions are not amenable to computation using social
planning problems because of the existence of real and financial frictions. They are not amenable
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to computation by projection methods with continuous equilibrium functions because a continuous
recursive representation of equilibrium may not exist. And they are not amenable to computation
by perturbation methods because the ergodic region may be quite large: Agents accumulate assets
to accommodate idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. All these computational methods may actually
generate large approximation errors.
To overcome these rather limiting technicalities, we propose a reliable recursive equilibrium
algorithm. Our approach is intended to be quite general – available characterizations of equilibria
are usually model-dependent. We consider an abstract framework that covers equilibrium models
with various real and financial frictions, and resource and participation constraints. Convexity
assumptions are not necessary, but certain mild continuity and time-separability conditions must
be satisfied. That is, the model must be recursive: An equilibrium solution must be characterized
by aggregate resource constraints and short-run optimality conditions comprising only variables of
two contiguous time periods, t and t + 1.
Under mild regularity conditions, we can define a non-empty Markov equilibrium correspondence that generates the set of all sequential competitive equilibria. This correspondence lies in an
expanded state space, and can be obtained as the fixed point of a monotone operator embedding
all aggregate constraints and short-run equilibrium conditions. The iteration process under this
operator is globally convergent for every initial guess containing the Markov equilibrium correspondence.
We provide a discretized version of this operator which is also globally convergent. This discretized operator iterates over correspondences rather than functions. As we refine the discretization
process the fixed point of the discretized operator converges unif ormly to the Markov equilibrium
correspondence on every compact subdomain. In the present general context, uniform convergence
is a very strong approximation result. Actually, for economies where equilibrium is unique the
nature of our approximation scheme makes it possible to derive uniform error bounds.
In the numerical implementation of the algorithm, the choice of auxiliary variables conforming
the state space becomes critical. It is simplest to enlarge the state space with all endogenous and
exogenous variables, but then the algorithm may not be computable. In the above applications,
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the computation of equilibria relied on first-order conditions in which the auxiliary variables were
the shadow values of investment for each asset and for each agent. Under this choice of the state
space the Euler equations were linear – speeding up the computation process. The linearity of the
Euler equations was preserved in models with exogenous borrowing constraints. With endogenous
borrowing constraints, continuation utility values were also added to the state space. The final
objective is to work with a minimal extension of the state space that becomes operative at the
computational stage.
Our quantitative analysis ends with the simulation of a stochastic overlapping generation economy and a business cycle model of international trading along the lines of Kehoe and Perri (2002).
The overlapping generations economy was instrumental to illustrate some of the pitfalls that may
occur in the computation of equilibrium solutions for non-optimal economies while using algorithms
that search for a continuous equilibrium function over the natural space of state variables. These
traditional algorithms cannot insure convergence of the approximate solution to the given equilibrium fixed point. As a matter of fact, the computed solution contained large approximation errors
because of a poor choice of the state space.
In the numerical simulation of the two-country business cycle model, we contemplate various
scenarios for cross-country risk sharing in a full-blown economic setting with capital accumulation,
taxation, and preference shocks. Among all the financial arrangements, endogenous borrowing
constraints improve substantially the predictions of the model relative to the data. This is in line
with the findings of Kehoe and Perri (2002). As these authors point out, models with additional
frictions may be necessary to make the theory fully compatible with the data. Under our recursive
equilibrium algorithm, it was fairly easy to accommodate procyclical preference shocks and taxes.
These extensions improve the cross-country correlation of investment and labor.
All of these results add to a large body of literature in macroeconomics and finance intended to
overcome some severe limitations of the representative-agent paradigm. The quantitative analysis
of nonoptimal dynamic economies is certainly a non-trivial task. Hence, reliable methods for the
numerical approximation of these economies should prove very valuable. Feng (2012) generalizes
our computational approach to quantify the welfare loss of time inconsistency in an economy with
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capital and labor taxation.
Of course, our methods must face some computational challenges, since iteration over correspondences is much more costly than iteration over functions. The expansion of the state space
along with iteration over sets should certainly be manifested into an additional computational
burden. In the characterization of Markov equilibria, it is therefore imperative to select a set of
auxiliary variables with a view towards minimizing the computational cost. The development of
high-performance, parallel computing will certainly make our methods more attractive as the many
computational tasks in our algorithm can be decentralized.
The numerical implementation of our algorithm starts with an initial correspondence of potential
equilibrium values. In most numerical work it is necessary to bound the ergodic region. This task,
however, may become much more delicate for nonoptimal economies since no general theory is
available to bound asset prices and returns. In our applications above we have developed various
procedures to bound equilibrium allocations and prices by ruling asset pricing bubbles and by
defining a value function for each household over future equilibrium paths. This value function
is convenient because it can embed exogenous and endogenous borrowing constraints, as well as
other real and financial frictions. Hence, market imperfections need not be explicitly considered to
bound equilibrium allocations and prices. These techniques should certainly be valuable to establish
feasible bounds in related models with heterogeneous agents and market distortions.
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Appendix
A.1. Proofs
In this Appendix we prove some key results formally stated in Sections 3 and 4. For convenience,
we also offer a proof of existence for the model of Section 6, and establish equilibrium bounds. All
other claims in the paper rely on similar arguments.
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
Let Vb0 ⊃ V ∗ , and Vbi = B(Vbi−1 ) for all i ≥ 1. To insure monotone convergence, let us now
b
redefine these sets as Vn = ∪∞
i=n Vi , for all n ≥ 0. Then Vn = B(Vn−1 ) and Vn ⊂ Vn−1 for all n ≥ 1.
It follows that the sequence {Vn } must converge to a set V U . Further, V U = ∩∞
n=1 Vn . Therefore,
V U = B(V U ). We next prove that V U = V ∗ . Indeed, by the monotonicity of operator B we get
that V ∗ ⊂ V U ; also, V U ⊂ V ∗ since every fixed point conforms an equilibrium – given that no
transversality conditions are involved in this setting. To complete the proof of the theorem, just
note that V U ⊂ V ∗ ⊂ Vn for all n ≥ 1. Since we have already established that Vn → V U , we get
that Vn → V ∗ . It is clear from these arguments that V ∗ is the largest fixed-point of operator B.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
(i) Obvious. Operator B h,Σ is monotone, V0 ⊇ V ∗ and B h,Σ (V ∗ ) ⊃ V ∗ .
(ii) The proof follows similar arguments as that of Theorem 3.1. Actually, Vnh,Σ ⊃ V ∗,h,Σ , and
our discretized procedure allows for a finite number of set-values. Hence, pointwise convergence
implies uniform convergence.
(iii) Note that operator B h,Σ converges to B as h → 0 and Σ → ∞. Since V ∗ ⊂ V ∗,h,Σ , we get
that V ∗,h,Σ → V ∗ as h → 0 and Σ → ∞.
Proof of Theorem 4.2:
The proof goes by contradiction. Since X × Y is a compact set every sequence must have
a convergent subsequence; further, graph(V ∗ ) is always a subset of graph(Vnh,Σ ). Hence, if the
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h,Σ
assertion of Theorem 4.2 is not true there is a converging sequence {(xh,Σ
n , z, vn )} → (x, z, v) with
h,Σ
h,Σ
(xh,Σ
) and d(graph(Vnh,Σ ), graph(V ∗ )) > . As h → 0, Σ → ∞, and n → ∞,
n , z, vn ) ∈ graph(Vn

we must have (cf. Theorem 3.1) that (x, z, v) ∈ graph(V ∗ ). However, this is in contradiction with
the previous assertion that d(graph(Vnh,Σ ), graph(V ∗ )) >  for all Σ, h, n.
Proof of Proposition 6.2:
The existence of a SCE can be established by approximating the infinite-horizon economy by a
sequence of finite economies. This is the strategy followed by Jones and Manuelli (1999), but their
proof does not apply to sequential competitive economies. Of course, the hardest part is to provide
upper bounds for equilibrium quantities over all the finite-horizon economies. These bounds follow
from Proposition 6.3 below.
Hence, following Jones and Manuelli (1999), we consider the following steps for the proof of
a SCE: (i) Existence of an equilibrium for a finite horizon economy. This result is covered by
the general proofs of existence of competitive equilibria for economies with taxes, externalities,
and incomplete markets (Arrow and Hahn 1971, Levine and Zame 1996, Mantel 1975, and Shafer
and Sonneschein 1976). (ii) Uniform bounds for equilibrium allocations and prices of finite-horizon
economies. As already pointed out, these bounds are established in Proposition 6.3 below. (iii) Existence of SEC as a limit point of finite equilibria. The preceding steps (i) and (ii) guarantee that there
l
i
l
i
(z t ))
(z t ), bi (z t , ξt+1
(z t )), Kt+1
(z t ), Lit (z t ), rti (z t ), wti (z t )}i=1,2 , q(z t , ξt+1
is a collection of vectors {cit (z t ), lti (z t ), kt+1

that can be obtained as limits of equilibria of finite economies. It is obvious that for such limiting
solution the market clearing conditions must be satisfied at each z t , and that one period-profits are
i
l
(z t ), bi (z t , ξt+1
(z t ))
maximized. Moreover, for each agent i the limiting allocation (cit (z t ), lti (z t ), kt+1

must satisfy the sequence of budget constraints (27), as well as the endogenous or exogenous constraints. This allocation is optimal since the discounted utility function is continuous in the product

topology over the set of feasible consumption/leisure plans cit (z t ) , 1 − lti (z t ) t≥0 which are pre
ferred to the endowment allocation eit (zt ) , 1 t≥0 . This is because feasible consumption plans


cit (z t ) t≥0 are bounded above, and the endowment process eit (zt ) t≥0 is bounded below by a
positive quantity and the endowment of leisure is always equal to one.
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t≥0

Proof of Proposition 6.3:
We first show that there are positive constants K max and K min such that for every equilibrium

P2
i
sequence of physical capital vectors kt+1
(z t )) t≥0 if K max ≥ i=1 k0i (z 0 ) ≥ K min then K max ≥
P2
i
t
min
for all z t . The existence of K max follows directly from Assumption 6.1, since
i=1 kt+1 (z ) ≥ K
the marginal productivity of capital converges to zero as K goes to ∞ for every fixed 0 ≤ L ≤ 1.
Also, it obvious that K min ≥ 0.
We now claim that there are constants rmax and wmax such that for every equilibrium sequence

of factor prices rti (z t ) , wti (z t ) t≥0 we have 0 ≤ rti (z t ) ≤ rmax and 0 ≤ wti (z t ) ≤ wmax for all z t .
The existence of wmax follows from continuity properties of the utility function. The household
is endowed with one unit of labor. Hence, if the wage is arbitrarily high it would be optimal to
consume a large amount of consumption by giving up a small quantity of leisure. If along an equilibrium path we have that rti is arbitrarily large, then kti must go to zero. From the Euler equation,
consumption cit must also go to zero. But this is not possible under either exogenous or endogenous
constraints, as eit > 0 is bounded below by a positive quantity, and in the debt constrained economy the household can switch to autarky. Moreover, using a simple arbitrage argument, we have
that qt is also bounded. Hence, the value function J i (k0i , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) is well
defined. As already pointed out the derivative Dk,b J i (·, ·, z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) is continuous in (k0i , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )).7 By a simple notational change it follows from
(27) that function J i can be rewritten as J i (ai0 , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), q(z0 ), K(z0 )) w0 (z0 ), K(z0 )),
where ai0 = ei0 (z0 ) + (1 − τ ) r0 k0i . Then, we can conclude that
0 ≤ Dk,b J i (k0i , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), K(z0 )) ≤ γ
b, since ei0 (z0 ) is bounded below by a positive number, and all feasible vectors (k0i , bi0 , z0 , r0 (z0 ), w0 (z0 ), K(z0 )) lie in a compact set.
7

Note that if bi0 is a large negative number then the value function is well defined, but the agent will switch to

autarky. In the autarky region the derivative of J i with respect to bi0 is zero. Hence, at the point of switching to
autarky, the derivative of J i will not be continuous but the differential is a compact correspondence.
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A.2. Numerical Algorithm
The overlapping generations economy of section 2.1
We discretize the state space with Ni equally spaced intervals. We discretize the graph of V with
Ni × Nj rectangles. We then test all points inside each rectangle to check whether the one-period
temporary equilibrium conditions are satisfied. Our operator generates a new correspondence made
up of those rectangles surviving the test, and we use an index function to keep track of them. It
is straightforward to extend this construction to a multi-dimensional state state X. In such a case,
we will use hype-cubes to implement the discretization. The details are below.
n
h
io
i
We partition the state space with X = ∪i X i = ∪i x|x ∈ x + (x − x) Ni−1
,
x
+
(x
−
x)
.
Ni −1
i −1
For an initial value correspondence V (0) ⊇ V ∗ , the discretization proceeds as follows:
h,Σ,(0)

V h,Σ,(0) (x) = ∪i,j Vi,j
(x)



i
i
i
i
j−1
j
= ∪i,j m|x ∈ Xi , m ∈ mX + (mX i − mX )
, mX + (mX i − mX )
,
Nj − 1
Nj − 1
i

where i = 1...Ni − 1, j = 1...Nj − 1, x = inf X, x = sup X, mX = inf V (0) (x|x ∈ Xi ), mX i =
sup V (0) (x|x ∈ Xi ), h =

(x−x)
Ni −1 ,

i

Σ = maxi

(mX i −mX )
.
Nj −1

We also define an index function g (0) (i, j) =

1, for all i ∈ {1, ..., Ni − 1}, j ∈ {1, ..., Nj }.
Now, here are the workings of the algorithm. At iteration n, consider any b ∈ X i and m ∈
h,Σ,(n)

Vi,j

(b). If g (n) (i, j) = 1, then we test whether there is any b+ ∈ X and m+ ∈ V h,Σ,(n) (b+ )

such that the one-period temporary equilibrium conditions can be satisfied. We let g (n+1) (i, j) = 1
in the affirmative case; for otherwise, we let g (n+1) (i, j) = 0. We let g (n+1) (i, j) = 0 if g (n) (i, j) =


0. After completing the above procedure for all i, j, we update V h,Σ,(n+1) (b) ≡ B V h,Σ,(n) =
n
o
h,Σ,(n)
∪i,j Vi,j
(b)|g (n+1) (i, j) = 1 . We repeat this whole procedure until convergence convergence
is reached; namely, we set V ∗ = V h,Σ,(n+1) (x) if V h,Σ,(n+1) (x) = V h,Σ,(n) (x).

40

The overlaping generations economy of section 5.3
n
h
io
i
We partition the state space with X = ∪i X i = ∪i x|x ∈ x + (x − x) Ni−1
.
,
x
+
(x
−
x)
Ni −1
i −1
For an initial value correspondence V (0) ⊇ V ∗ , the discretization works as follows:
h,Σ,(0)

V h,Σ,(0) (x) = ∪i,j1 ,j2 Vi,j1 ,j2 (x)
io
n
i h

 h
i
1,X i
2,X i
2,X i
= ∪i,j1 ,j2 m1 , m2 |x ∈ Xi , m1 , m2 ∈ mj1,X
,
m
×
m
,
m
,
−1
j
j
−1
j
1
1
2
2
i

i

= m1,X + (m1,X i −
where i = 1...Ni − 1, j1 , j2 = 1...Nj − 1, x = inf X, x = sup X, m1,X
j1
i

i

i

i

i

m1,X ) Njj1−1 , m2,X
= m2,X + (m2,X i − m2,X ) Njj2−1 , m1,X = inf V (0) (x, m2 |x ∈ Xi ), m1,X i =
j2
i

sup V (0) (x, m2 |x ∈ Xi ), m2,X = inf V (0) (x, m1 |x ∈ Xi ), m2,X i = sup V (0) (x, m1 |x ∈ Xi ), h =


i
i
(x−x)
(m1,X i −m1,X )
(m2,X i −m2,X )
, maxi
. We also define an index function
Ni −1 , Σ = max maxi
Nj −1
Nj −1
1

g

(0)

2

(i, j1 , j2 ) = 1, for all i ∈ {1, ..., Ni − 1}, j1 , j2 ∈ {1, ..., Nj }. As you can read from the defih,Σ,(0)

nition of Vi,j1 ,j2 (x), we now approximate the graph of V using Ni × Nj × Nj cubes.
Now, here are the workings of the algorithm.

At iteration n, consider any θ ∈ X i and

h,Σ,(n)

m ∈ Vi,j1 ,j2 (θ). If g (n) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 1, then we test whether there is any θ+ ∈ X and m+ ∈
V h,Σ,(n) (θ+ ) such that the one-period temporary equilibrium conditions can be satisfied. We let
g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 1 in the affirmative case; for otherwise, we let g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 0. We let
g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 0 if g (n) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 0. After going through all i, j1 , j2 , we update V h,Σ,(n+1) (b) ≡
o
n


h,Σ,(n)
B V h,Σ,(n) = ∪i,j1 ,j2 Vi,j1 ,j2 (b)|g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 1 . We repeat this whole procedure until convergence is reached; namely, we set V ∗ = V h,Σ,(n+1) (x) if V h,Σ,(n+1) (x) = V h,Σ,(n) (x). Here is some
supplementary information regarding the iteration process:
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h,Σ,(n)

1. For each X i , and (m1 , m2 ) ∈ Vi,j1 ,j2 , if g (n) (i, j) = 1, we check the following conditions:

(42)
(43)
(44)

12 + p + θ 4 + 48p − 4θ
+
= 13
4p1/5 + p
p1/5 + 4p
q
1
5 = Em+
1
(e1 (z) − qθ)
q
2
5 = Em+ .
2
(e1 (z) + qθ)

If (42 - 44 ) are satisfied, we set g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 1. Otherwise we setg (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 0.
If g (n) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 0, we set g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 0 without checking the above conditions.

2. We go through all i = 1, ..., Ni − 1, j1 , j2 = 1, ..., Nj − 1. We then update V h,Σ,(n) as follows.
h
i
o
n
h,Σ,(n)
V h,Σ,(n+1) (x) ≡ B V h,Σ,(n) (x) = ∪i,j1 ,j2 Vi,j1 ,j2 (x)|g (n+1) (i, j1 , j2 ) = 1 .

3. Stop if V h,Σ,(n) = V h,Σ,(n+1) and set V ∗ = V h,Σ,(n+1) . Otherwise, we restart from step 1
until convergence is reached.

The international risk sharing model of section 6.5
We approximate both the state space X and the graph of V with hype-cubes:



 

X = ∪i X i = ∪i x|x ∈ [bi1 −1 , bi1 ] × ki12 −1 , ki12 × ki22 −1 , ki22 × Z × Z ,

where x = b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 , i = (i1 , i2 , i3 ), i1 , i2 , i3 = 1...Ni − 1, bi1 = b + (b − b) Nii1−1 , ki12 =
k + (k − k) Nii2−1 , ki23 = k + (k − k) Nii3−1 , Z = {z1 , .., zN }. For an initial value correspondence
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V (0) ⊇ V ∗ , the discretization works as follows
h,Σ,(0)

V h,Σ,(0) (x) = ∪i,j Vi,j
(
= ∪i,j

(x)

)
i h
i
Y h %,X i
i
i
i
%,X
%,X
y|x ∈ Xi , y ∈
mj%,m −1 , m%,X
,
j%,m × pj%,p −1 , pj%,p
%


where y = m1 , m2 , p1 , p2 , % = 1, 2 is the index for country, j%,m , j%,p = 1...Nj −1, j = (j1,m , j2,m , j1,p , j2,p ),
i

i

i

j

i

i

i

j

i

i

%,X
%,X
%,X
m%,X
+ (m%,X i − m%,X ) N%,m
+ (p%,X i − p%,X ) Nj%,p
and p%,X are
, p%,X
j%,m = m
j%,p = p
−1 , m
j −1

the inf of m% , p% for given (m−% , p−% ) at X i , and m%,X i and p%,X i are the sup of m% , p% . Finally,


i
i
(p%,X i −p%,X )
(m%,X i −m%,X )
Σ = max max%
, max%
.
Nj −1
Nj −1
We also define an index function g (0) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 1. Now, here are the workings of the
algorithm:



h,Σ,(n)
1. At iteration n, consider any x = b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ X i and m1 , m2 , p1 , p2 ∈ Vi,j
(x). If

g (n) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 1, Then we test whether there is any x+ ∈ X and y = m1+ , m2+ , p1+ , p2+ ∈
V h,Σ,(n) (x+ ) such that the one-period temporary equilibrium conditions can be satisfied.
More specifically, we test whether any of the cases (1-3) described below are met. We let
g (n+1) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 1 in the affirmative case; for otherwise, we let g (n+1) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 0. If
g (n) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 0, we set g (n+1) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 0 without checking the above conditions.
2. We go through all i, z 1 , z 2 , j. We then update V h,Σ,(n) :

(45)

h
i
n
o
h,Σ,(n)
V h,Σ,(n+1) (x) ≡ B V h,Σ,(n) (x) = ∪i,j Vi,j
(x)|g (n+1) (i, z 1 , z 2 , j) = 1 .

3. Stop if V h,Σ,(n) = V h,Σ,(n+1) and set V ∗ = V h,Σ,(n) . Otherwise, we restart from step 1 until
convergence is reached.

Here is some supplementary information regarding the iteration process:
Case 1,
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uc (c% , l% ) − β

(46)

X

π(z+ |z)m%z+ = 0

z+

p% = u(c% , l% ) + β

(47)

X

i
π(z+ |z)p%z+ > Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )

z+

(48)

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
p%z+ ∈ [p%min (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
), pimax (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
)]

(49)

p% ∈ [p%min (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), pimax (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )]

Case 2,

• country 1:

uc (c1 , l1 ) − β

(50)

X

π(z+ |z)m1z+ > 0

z+

(51)

u(c1 , l1 ) + β

X

1
2
1
2
1
π(z+ |z)p1min (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
) ≤ Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )

z+

(52)

1
Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) ≤ u(c1 , l1 ) + β

X

1
2
1
2
π(z+ |z)p1max (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
)

z+

(53)

1
Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ [p1min (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), p1max (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )]
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• country 2:

(54)

uc (c2 , l2 ) − β

X

π(z+ |z)m2z+ = 0

z+

(55)

p2 = u(c2 , l2 ) + β

X

2
π(z+ |z)p2z+ > Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )

z+

(56)

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
, k+
, z+
, z+
), p2max (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
)]
p2z+ ∈ [p2min (b+ , k+

(57)

p2 ∈ [p2min (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), p2max (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )]

Case 3,

• country 1:

(58)

uc (c1 , l1 ) − β

X

π(z+ |z)m1z+ = 0

z+

(59)

p1 = u(c1 , l1 ) + β

X

1
π(z + |z)p1z+ > Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )

z+

(60)

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
p1z+ ∈ [p1min (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
), p1max (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
)]

(61)

p1 ∈ [p1min (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), p1max (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )]
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• country 2:

(62)

uc (c2 , l2 ) − β

X

π(z+ |z)m2z+ > 0

z+

(63)

2
Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) ≤ u(c2 , l2 ) + β

X

1
2
1
2
π(z+ |z)p2max (b+ , k+
, k+
, z+
, z+
)

z+

(64)

2
Vaut
(b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ [p2min (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), p2max (b, k 1 , k 2 , z 1 , z 2 )]
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